

# **“Global Terrorism: Threats to the Homeland,” Part 1**

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## **What are the terrorist threats to the United States?<sup>1</sup>**

Since the 9/11 attacks, no foreign terrorist organization has successfully directed or carried out a deadly attack in the United States. With ISIS's territorial collapse, the threat posed by the group has receded. It has been more than a year since the last lethal jihadist terrorist attack in the United States, and the number of jihadist terrorism cases in the United States has declined substantially since its peak in 2015. However, "homegrown" jihadist terrorism, including that inspired by ISIS, is likely to remain a threat. While ISIS's inspirational power has lessened in recent years, white supremacist extremism is increasingly inspiring deadly violence.<sup>1</sup> The most likely threat to the United States comes from "homegrown" terrorists inspired by a mixture of ideologies including jihadist, far right, and idiosyncratic strains, who are radicalized via the Internet and take advantage of the availability of semi-automatic firearms in the United States. The "travel ban" is not an effective response to any of these threats.

The threat to the United States from jihadist terrorism is relatively limited. New America's "Terrorism in America After 9/11" project tracks the 479 cases of individuals who have been charged with jihadist terrorism-related activity in the United States since September 11, 2001.<sup>2</sup> In the 18 years since 9/11, individuals motivated by jihadist ideology have killed 104 people in the United States. Every one of those deaths is a tragedy, but they are not national catastrophes as 9/11 was. The death toll from jihadist terrorism over the past 18 years is far lower than what even the most optimistic of analysts projected in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Al-Qaeda and its breakaway faction, ISIS, have failed to direct a successful attack in the United States since the 9/11 attacks and none of the perpetrators of the 13 lethal jihadist attacks in the United States since those attacks received training from a foreign terrorist group.

ISIS did manage to inspire an unprecedented number of Americans to conduct attacks and otherwise engage in jihadist activity. In 2015, 80 people were charged<sup>2</sup> in the United States with jihadist terrorism activity, the highest number in the post-9/11 era. More than three-quarters of all deaths caused by jihadists in the United States since the 9/11 attacks occurred in 2014 or later, the period when ISIS came to prominence.

However, there has not been a deadly jihadist terrorist attack in the United States in more than a year. The last lethal attack was a March 2018 stabbing in Florida that killed one

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<sup>1</sup> Thanks to David Sterman and Melissa Salyk-Virk of New America for their inputs to this testimony.

<sup>2</sup> This number includes a small number of people who died before being charged but were widely reported to have engaged in jihadist terrorism related criminal activity.

person. The perpetrator was a 17-year-old who admitted being inspired in part by ISIS.<sup>3</sup> Even in this case, the perpetrator appears to have been influenced by a range of extremist ideologies, including white supremacy.<sup>4</sup>

ISIS's ability to inspire violence in the United States has suffered in the wake of its territorial losses, but policymakers should not expect ISIS's territorial collapse to remove the threat of ISIS-inspired terrorism in the United States. Sayfullo Saipov's truck ramming attack that killed eight people in Manhattan in October 2017 happened the same month that ISIS lost control of its capital in Raqqa, Syria.

While the number of terrorism cases isn't an exact proxy for levels of threat, it certainly says something about the scale of the threat. The number of cases of individuals charged with jihadist terrorism-related crimes has dramatically decreased since 2015 when it was at its peak with 80 cases. There have been 19 such cases as of the end of September 6, 2019.

The relatively limited jihadist terrorist threat to the United States is in large part the result of the enormous investment the country has made in strengthening its defenses against terrorism in the post-9/11 era. The United States spent \$2.8 trillion on counterterrorism efforts from 2002 to 2017, constituting almost 15 percent of discretionary spending during that time frame.<sup>5</sup> That effort has made the United States a hard target.<sup>6</sup> On 9/11, there were 16 people on the U.S. "No Fly" list.<sup>7</sup> In 2016, there were 81,000 people on the list.<sup>8</sup> Before 9/11, there was no Department of Homeland Security, National Counterterrorism Center, or Transportation Security Administration. As a result, in January 2019, Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats testified that the United States is a "generally inhospitable operating environment" for homegrown violent extremists compared to most Western countries.<sup>9</sup>

By the beginning of the Trump administration, the jihadist threat inside the United States was overwhelmingly lone-actor, ISIS-inspired attacks such as Sayfullo Saipov's 2017 vehicular ramming in Manhattan. This threat has stressed law enforcement, given the diversity of the perpetrators and the lack of organization needed to conduct such attacks. However, it is still a far cry from the type of attack that al-Qaeda carried out on 9/11.

Law enforcement and intelligence services will still need to combat and monitor the threat to the homeland from foreign terrorist organizations. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's attempt to bring down a US-bound passenger jet in 2009 with a bomb hidden in a terrorist's underwear and the case the same year in which three Americans trained with al-Qaeda and returned with a plan to bomb the New York City subway, and the 2010 failed Times Square bombing by Faisal Shahzad, who trained with the Pakistani

Taliban, are reminders of this. But the fact is that these failed attempts by Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) occurred a decade ago indicating that these FTOs were having quite a difficult time launching successful attacks in the United States whatever their goals might be to do so.

## **The Most Likely Terrorist Threat: Individuals Inspired by a Range of Ideologies and White Supremacy**

Today, the terrorist threat to the United States is emerging from across the political spectrum, as ubiquitous firearms, political polarization, images of the apocalyptic violence tearing apart societies across the Middle East and North Africa, racism, and the rise of populism have combined with the power of online communication and social media. This mixture has generated a complex and varied terrorist threat that crosses ideologies and is largely disconnected from traditional understandings of terrorist organizations.<sup>10</sup>

Since the 9/11 attacks, individuals inspired by jihadist ideology have killed 104 people in the United States. However, individuals inspired by far-right ideology (including white supremacist, anti-government, and anti-abortion views) have killed 109 people. On August 3, 2019, Patrick Crusius, a 21-year-old white man, allegedly shot and killed 22 people at a Walmart in El Paso, Texas after posting a manifesto that described his motive as a purported “Hispanic invasion.”<sup>11</sup> The attack was the deadliest far-right attack in the post-9/11 era.

Individuals inspired in part by Black Nationalist ideology have killed eight people since 9/11, and individuals inspired by forms of ideological misogyny also killed eight people during this period, for instance, a shooter killed six in Isla Vista, California, in 2014 in attacks he framed in terms of his hatred for women.<sup>12</sup> And last year, a gunman killed two women at a yoga studio in Tallahassee, Florida, using the same rationale.<sup>13</sup> The diversity of terrorists’ political motivations warns against overly focusing on any single ideology.

Though there are many ideological strands, and attackers’ ideological reference points are often in flux or complex, one particular ideological strand – white supremacy – stands out as a particular danger. Since the inauguration of President Donald Trump, the United States has seen a spate of deadly white supremacist terrorist attacks. Every deadly far right attack in this period identified by New America had a nexus to white supremacy – together killing forty-three people; four times the number of people killed by jihadist terrorists in the same period. There were also more than three times as many deadly far-right attacks with connections to white supremacy in the same period as lethal jihadist attacks.

According to Michael McGarrity, assistant director of the FBI's counterterrorism division, and Calvin Shivers, deputy assistant director of the criminal investigative division, "individuals adhering to racially motivated violent extremism ideology have been responsible for the most lethal incidents among domestic terrorists in recent years, and the FBI assesses the threat of violence and lethality posed by racially motivated violent extremists will continue." In July 2019 the FBI Director Christopher Wray, testified that there have been about 100 domestic terrorism-related arrests during the past nine months.

White supremacist terrorist attacks and violence more generally, appears to be increasingly interlinked and internationalized. A study by *The New York Times* determined that "at least a third of white extremist killers since 2011 were inspired by others who perpetrated similar attacks" and that the connections crossed international borders. Crusius who carried out the attack at the Walmart in El Paso in August had posted a manifesto on 8chan, an online message board often featuring racist postings, about his support for the terrorist who had killed 50 worshippers at two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand six months earlier.

Just as school shooters learn from other school shooters, terrorists learn from other terrorists. Notably, the terrorist who carried out the Christchurch attack had posted a manifesto to 8chan just before he carried out the attacks at the mosques. Crusius's online manifesto referred to a "Hispanic invasion" of Texas as the rationale for his imminent terrorist attack in El Paso. Trump has also described migrants coming across the southern border as an "invasion." However, Crusius said his views about immigrants predated Trump becoming president.

## **The Territorial Defeat of ISIS in Syria and Iraq**

Over the past year, the United States and its partners have successfully eliminated all of ISIS's territory in Iraq and Syria. In March, the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) liberated ISIS's last piece of territory in Syria in Baghuz. The loss of its territory in Iraq and Syria dramatically undercut ISIS's claim that it is the caliphate, because the caliphate has historically been a substantial geographic entity, such as the Ottoman Empire, as well as a theological construct.<sup>14</sup> The so-called caliphate also allowed the organization to have a constant influx of money through the taxation and extortion of millions of subjects, oil sales, ransoms and antiquities sales.<sup>15</sup>

As ISIS's territorial caliphate collapsed, there was a noticeable decline in its propaganda capability. Key propaganda outputs including ISIS's English-language magazine

*Rumiyah* ceased publication.<sup>16</sup> According to Europol’s 2019 report, ISIS’s losses “had a significant impact on its digital capabilities,” leaving its weekly Arabic *Al-Naba* newsletter as its only regular output.<sup>17</sup> The United Nations Sanctions Monitoring Team’s January 2019 assessment said that “the propaganda machinery of the ISIL core is further decentralizing, and the quality of its material continues to decline.”<sup>18</sup>

## **Limits to ISIS’s Defeat in Syria and Iraq**

While ISIS’s territorial collapse represents a major success for the counter-ISIS coalition, the group remains capable of exploiting current and potential future instability in Iraq and Syria to improve its position. The U.N. Sanctions Monitoring Committee in February 2019 assessed that in Iraq, the group’s transition “into a covert network is well advanced” and that ISIS poses a “major threat” in the form of assassinations of officials and “frequent attacks” on civilians.<sup>19</sup> Indeed, precursors of ISIS previously demonstrated their ability to continue operations in areas where it has lost territory during the “surge” of U.S. troops in Iraq in 2008.<sup>20</sup> A particular concern is the Al Hol refugee camp in Kurdish-controlled Syria where 70,000 mostly women and children from countries around the world are warehoused. ISIS’s ideology is alive and well in the camp according to multiple government and media reports.

However, there are other factors that may limit the group’s ability to achieve a resurgence in the near-term. Iraq has exited the ISIS crisis in far better shape than conventional wisdom expected at the outset of the counter-ISIS campaign, providing a stronger basis for preventing an ISIS resurgence having faced it once already.<sup>21</sup> In addition, the presence in the region of U.S. forces as well as the U.S. backed Syrian Democratic Forces and the well-trained Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service makes an ISIS resurgence less likely. However, the territorial defeat of ISIS in Syria and Iraq does not mean the defeat of the organization as a whole, let alone the larger jihadist movement.

## **ISIS Beyond Syria and Iraq**

On Easter Sunday, April 21, 2019, terrorists killed more than 250 people in coordinated bombings of three churches and three hotels in Sri Lanka.<sup>22</sup> The two groups tied to the attacks are ISIS<sup>23</sup> and National Thowheed Jamath (NTJ).<sup>24</sup> ISIS claimed the attack two days after it took place, and later reporting indicated that multiple family networks coordinated the bombings. According to the United Nations Secretary General’s July 2019 report on the threat posed by ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, ISIS’s leader, was not aware of the attack before it happened.<sup>25</sup> However, the attackers were sufficiently connected to ISIS’s network that ISIS was able to release video of the attack via its official platforms.<sup>26</sup>

The Sri Lanka attack illustrates ISIS's ability to inspire attacks outside of Syria and Iraq. And it is not a stand-alone case. Since 2017 ISIS, and its supporters, have conducted attacks in more than 25 countries.<sup>27</sup> Even so, there is reason for optimism. The United Nations Sanctions Monitoring Team reported a "substantial reduction in global external attacks" associated with ISIS in 2018.<sup>28</sup>

ISIS's ability to conduct such attacks is bolstered by two overlapping sources of international strength. One is its online networks – or what some have termed a "Virtual Caliphate" – which produce and spread propaganda but also provide advice for attacks while helping ISIS's central organization claim ties to attacks carried out by militants thousands of miles away. The second factor is ISIS's more official structure of *wilayat* (provinces) and affiliates. In January 2019, the U.N. Sanctions Monitoring Team reported that a centralized ISIS leadership remains that "communicates and provides resources to its affiliates, albeit at a reduced level."<sup>29</sup> Al-Qaeda's continued existence and maintenance of its own affiliate network after Osama Bin Laden's death warns against dismissing the ability of the group to maintain a coherent albeit reduced network after territorial or leadership losses.

ISIS has shown some evidence of its ability to build or sustain its brand and affiliate structure in the wake of the territorial collapse in Syria and Iraq. In April 2019, it claimed its first attack in the Democratic Republic of Congo, announcing a Central African "province."<sup>30</sup>

On the other hand, the strength of ISIS's affiliates should not be overestimated. Giving ISIS too much credit for its control over affiliates with pre-existing constituencies or exaggerating its affiliates' strength can aid ISIS's media strategy of portraying itself as in control of a highly centralized, globalized Caliphate even in the wake of its territorial defeat in Iraq and Syria.<sup>31</sup> Many of ISIS's affiliates and provinces are either struggling or are under substantial military pressure. In Libya, once viewed as a potential fallback for the group, ISIS lost its hold of the city of Sirte in late 2016.<sup>32</sup> Yet the group appears to continue to pose a resilient terrorist threat.<sup>33</sup>

In other areas, where ISIS held less power, affiliates are facing even tougher environments. In January 2019, the U.N. Sanctions Monitoring Committee reported that ISIS "in Yemen now has only a few mobile training camps and a dwindling number of fighters," that the group is not economically self-sufficient, that it recruits few foreign fighters, and that its activities in Al-Bayda "now consist mainly of protecting the group's leaders and their family members."<sup>34</sup> Some affiliates have also seen the deaths of important leaders. For example, Abdulhakim Dhuqub, ISIS's second in command in

Somalia, was killed by a U.S. airstrike in April 2019 in Xiriiro, Somalia.<sup>35</sup> Abu Sayed Orakzai, also known as Sad Arhab and the leader of ISIS in Afghanistan, was killed by an airstrike by Afghan and coalition forces in Afghanistan in August 2018.<sup>36</sup>

The ISIS affiliate in Afghanistan, however, continues to mount large-scale attacks as it did last month when an ISIS suicide bomber killed 63 people attending a wedding in the Afghan capital, Kabul. This attack underlined how careful the United States must be as it negotiates a withdrawal of forces with the Taliban. The U.S. must continue to maintain sufficient counterterrorism capacity to ensure that ISIS, al-Qaeda and elements of the Taliban that reject any kind of peace agreement with the Afghan government do not threaten the Afghan state or regroup sufficiently to plot attacks in the West.

## **The Resiliency of al-Qaeda**

Even as ISIS suffers repeated setbacks, al-Qaeda has shown resiliency in the face of the counterterrorism campaigns directed against it and the challenge from within the jihadist movement posed by the rise of ISIS. In August, al-Qaeda marked the 31<sup>st</sup> anniversary of its founding, making the group one of the longest-lasting terrorist groups in history.<sup>37</sup>

Eighteen years after 9/11, al-Qaeda continues to operate across North Africa and South Asia despite the heavy losses it has sustained, including the death of its founder, Osama bin Laden, and of dozens of other al-Qaeda leaders who have been killed in drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen. Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb all retain capacity for sustained local attacks.

In Syria, al-Qaeda's fortunes are far from clear, though any accounting must acknowledge a substantial al-Qaeda presence in the country. Al-Qaeda in Syria has undergone changes to its naming and organizational design. Initially known as the Nusra Front or Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda in Syria adopted the name Jabhat Fateh al-Sham in July 2016 to distance itself from al-Qaeda core, though then-Director of National Intelligence James Clapper labeled it a "PR move ... to create the image of being more moderate."<sup>38</sup> In January 2017 another rebranding occurred, with the group taking the name Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS).<sup>39</sup>

Despite its presence in a number of countries, al-Qaeda has not demonstrated a capability to strike the West in a decade and a half. The last deadly attack in the West directed by al-Qaeda was the July 7, 2005 bombing of London's transportation system, which killed 52 commuters.<sup>40</sup>



It is possible that al-Qaeda could feed off of ISIS's setbacks to regain leadership of the global jihadist movement.<sup>41</sup> The U.N. Sanctions Monitoring Team notes that al-Qaeda remains stronger than ISIS in some regions, and that its leader Ayman al-Zawahiri released more statements than ISIS's leader in 2018.<sup>42</sup> On the other hand, al-Qaeda has its own troubles with the death of Hamza bin Laden, who was widely believed to have been being groomed for leadership.<sup>43</sup> Hamza had appeared in al-Qaeda propaganda videos since he was a child. In recent years, he also had started releasing statements that positioned himself as one of al-Qaeda's ideologues — for instance, Hamza released a statement in 2016 calling for unity among the jihadist militants fighting in Syria. Earlier this year the U.S. State Department announced \$1 million reward for information about Hamza. Despite Hamza's increasing public profile there was no evidence to suggest that he played a successful operational role in al-Qaeda organizing terrorist attacks around the world.

The possibility of parts of ISIS and al-Qaeda merging also cannot be ruled out. At the very least, al-Qaeda's ability to remain resilient after decades of counterterrorism efforts suggests that ISIS remnants may similarly be able to continue on long after losing its hold on Syria and Iraq.

## **The Resiliency of Jihadism**

Beyond the fates of particular organizations, the jihadist movement has proven resilient in the Middle East, parts of the Sahel, North Africa and the Horn of Africa, as well as South Asia. This is in large part because of continuing instability across these regions.<sup>44</sup> Underlying stressors include the Sunni-Shia sectarian conflict that overlaps with the Saudi-Iran regional proxy war playing out in Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere; state collapse across the Middle East and North Africa, most extensively in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen; high unemployment and economic strain in much of the region; and an ongoing youth bulge.<sup>45</sup> This combination of factors, along with trends that reduce the barriers to entry to jihadist organizing including the sustained use of social media, make it likely that instability will continue in the Middle East and North Africa and that this instability will enable jihadist activity for the foreseeable future.

Further escalations in either the U.S.-Iran or the Saudi-Iran conflicts could provide fresh fuel for jihadists. A major escalation or war would likely fuel apocalypticism in the region and do so in a way that aligns with the jihadist ideology that has framed Iran and Shia Muslims as enemies; the consequences could be similar to the regional catastrophe triggered by the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq.<sup>46</sup>

## **Key Trends in Terrorism**

### **Low-Tech Attacks: Firearms, Knives, and Vehicles**

The United States should expect low-tech forms of violence (reliant on firearms, knives, and vehicular rammings) to remain the most common type of terrorist violence in the West.<sup>47</sup> Of the eight jihadist attacks in the West in 2019 identified by New America, only one involved explosives. In six of the eight attacks, a knife or other bladed weapon was used. In one attack, the perpetrator attempted but failed to carry out a vehicular ramming. Of the 108 jihadist attacks in the West since 2014 identified by New America, only 18 have involved explosives. Of the 14 deadly jihadist attacks in the United States since 9/11, only two involved explosives. In contrast, 10 involved firearms.

### **Explosives and TATP<sup>48</sup>**

The attacks involving explosives in the West since 2014 can be divided into two categories: 1) those involving TATP, triacetone triperoxide, which has long been the bomb of choice for jihadists in the West due to the ease of acquiring the components to make it, as compared to military-grade explosives; and 2) those involving improvised explosives. Seven of the eighteen attacks in the West involving explosives since 2014 involved TATP. Eleven involved other improvised explosives.

TATP can be built using the common household ingredient hydrogen peroxide, which is used to bleach hair. Though generally more accessible than military grade explosives in the West, making a TATP bomb is tricky because the ingredients are highly unstable and can explode if improperly handled. The danger of building TATP bombs without training can be seen in the case of Matthew Rugo and Curtis Jetton, 21-year-old roommates in Texas City, Texas.<sup>49</sup> They didn't have any bomb-making training and were manufacturing explosives in 2006 from concentrated bleach when their concoction blew up, killing Rugo and injuring Jetton. The pair had no political motives: They had just wanted to blow up vehicles for fun.

TATP therefore can indicate that a perpetrator received training or direction from a foreign terrorist group. Indeed, three of the seven attacks involving TATP since 2014 – the 2015 Paris bombings, the 2016 bombings of the Brussels metro and airport by the same ISIS cell, and the 2017 bombing of an Ariana Grande concert in Manchester, England – were directed by ISIS.

The four other attacks since 2014 involving TATP – the September 2017 bombing at the Parsons Green tube station in London in which the bomb failed to fully explode; the August 2017 attacks in Barcelona where traces of TATP were found at a suspected bomb factory tied to the plot; a June 2017 failed bombing of the Brussels metro that killed only the perpetrator; and a May 2019 attack in which a 24-year-old Algerian man exploded a bomb that included TATP in Lyon, France, injuring 14 people – had no known operational link to ISIS.<sup>50</sup> These attacks account for less than 5 percent of all inspired or enabled attacks and only a third of inspired or enabled attacks involving explosives.

All of the attacks involving TATP occurred in Europe and none occurred in the United States, and is a sign of the greater development of and diffusion of expertise and technology in jihadist networks in Europe compared to the United States.

Eight ISIS-inspired attacks and three ISIS-enabled attack in the West since 2014 used other explosives. For example, Tashfeen Malik and Syed Rizwan Farook, who killed 14 people in San Bernardino, California, had built pipe bombs using Christmas lights and smokeless powder.<sup>51</sup> They learned the bomb recipe they used from *Inspire*, the English-language propaganda magazine of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, whose article “Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom” was also used by the Boston Marathon bombers.<sup>52</sup>

### **The Use of Armed Drones by Terrorist Groups**

The United States should expect the use of armed drones by terrorist groups and other non-state actors to expand. In August 2018, Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro was the target of a bungled assassination attempt utilizing two quadcopter drones rigged with explosives during a speech in Caracas.<sup>53</sup> He blamed far-right political opponents for what he called an assassination attempt.<sup>54</sup> This imaginative, yet forbidding, attack has not only raised concerns over the possibility of taking out a head of state with drones, but the possibility of attacks at public events, parades, sporting events, etc. Already, groups such as ISIS, Hezbollah, the Houthis in Yemen, and Hamas, among others, have all used drones in varying capacities, such as for surveillance and for armed attacks.<sup>55</sup>

ISIS has deployed drones extensively. In January 2017, ISIS announced in its newsletter “al-Naba” the establishment of the “Unmanned Aircraft of the Mujahideen,” an operational unit organized to engineer and deploy drones in combat.<sup>56</sup> The terror network has been experimenting with drone technology since at least 2015, when Kurdish fighters in Syria shot down two small commercial drones reportedly belonging to the group – both of which were armed with explosives.<sup>57</sup>

The Houthi rebels in Yemen have also been actively using drones. In the first half of 2019, they attacked the Jizan and Abha airports<sup>58</sup> in southern Saudi Arabia, as well as Saudi oil pipelines.<sup>59</sup> The multiple airport attacks have led to significant civilian injuries. This escalation does not show signs of stopping in the near future.

Though ISIS and the Houthis are the clearest cases of sustained armed drone campaigns by non-state actors, numerous other groups have used drones in combat or maintain the capability to do so. Non-state actor UAV use has been seen in as many as twenty countries or territories, but only a fraction are used as weapons.<sup>60</sup> In most cases, UAV use has been for intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, reconnaissance, or logistics, and often used for criminal activities such as trafficking or smuggling.<sup>61</sup> In November 2018, Nigeria’s president announced that Boko Haram had acquired and begun using drones.<sup>62</sup> In July 2018, Russia claimed that one of its military bases in Syria was again attacked by drones,<sup>63</sup> though the responsible group is unknown. The PKK used drones against Turkish soldiers in August 2017.<sup>64</sup>

Hezbollah and Hamas were early adopters of drone technology and maintain an armed drone capability. In 2004, Hezbollah flew a military-grade drone, reportedly acquired from Iran, over Israeli airspace.<sup>65</sup> The Lebanese militant group also conducted strikes in Syria in 2014 with an armed drone and in 2016 with over-the-counter drones armed with small explosives.<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Peter Bergen, David Sterman, Albert Ford, and Alyssa Sims, "Terrorism in America After 9/11," *New America*, Accessed July 3, 2018, <https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/terrorism-in-america/>.

<sup>3</sup> "Incident/Investigation Report Case #17-000176" (Jupiter Police Department, January 12, 2017), <https://htv-prod-media.s3.amazonaws.com/files/juvenile-report-deadly-stabbing-suspect-1520986286.pdf>.

<sup>4</sup> Paul Mueller, "Former Homeland Security Official Says Better Communication Needed in Wake of Stabbing," *CBS 12*, March 14, 2018, <https://cbs12.com/news/local/former-homeland-security-official-says-better-communication-needed-in-wake-of-stabbing>.

<sup>5</sup> "Counterterrorism Spending: Protecting America While Promoting Efficiencies and Accountability," *Stimson Center*, May 2018, [https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/CT\\_Spending\\_Report\\_0.pdf](https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/CT_Spending_Report_0.pdf).

<sup>6</sup> This draws on: Peter Bergen, Emily Schneider, David Sterman, Bailey Cahall, and Tim Maurer, *2014: Jihadist Terrorism and Other Unconventional Threats* (Washington, DC: Bipartisan Policy Center, 2014), <https://bipartisanpolicy.org/library/2014-jihadist-terrorism-and-other-unconventional-threats/>

<sup>7</sup> Steve Kroft, "Unlikely Terrorists on No Fly List," *CBS News*, October 5, 2006, [www.cbsnews.com/news/unlikely-terrorists-on-no-fly-list/](http://www.cbsnews.com/news/unlikely-terrorists-on-no-fly-list/).

<sup>8</sup> "Feinstein Statement on Collins Amendment," Office of Senator Dianne Feinstein, June 23, 2016, <https://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=F02871C5-A023-4DEF-AEC3-EDAF34BEA2BF>.

<sup>9</sup> Daniel R. Coats, "Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community," § Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (2019), [https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf?utm\\_source=Gov%20Delivery%20Email&utm\\_medium=Email&utm\\_campaign=Media%20Contacts%20E-mail](https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf?utm_source=Gov%20Delivery%20Email&utm_medium=Email&utm_campaign=Media%20Contacts%20E-mail).

<sup>10</sup> Peter Bergen and David Sterman, "The Real Terrorist Threat in America," *Foreign Affairs*, October 30, 2018, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2018-10-30/real-terrorist-threat-america>.

<sup>11</sup> Peter Bergen and David Sterman, "The Huge Threat to America That Trump Ignores," *CNN*, August 4, 2019, <https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/04/opinions/el-paso-dayton-far-right-threat-bergen-sterman/index.html>.

<sup>12</sup> <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-43892189>

<sup>13</sup> <https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/local/yoga-shooting-incel-attack-fueled-by-male-supremacy/>

<sup>14</sup> Peter Bergen, "Is the Fall of Mosul the Fall of ISIS?," *CNN*, July 11, 2017, <http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/11/opinions/isis-loss-of-mosul-and-its-future-bergen/index.html>.

<sup>15</sup> Callimachi, "ISIS Caliphate Crumbles as Last Village in Syria Falls."

<sup>16</sup> "Twenty-First Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team."

<sup>17</sup> "Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2019 (TE-SAT)" (EUROPOL, 2019),

<https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2019-te-sat>.

<sup>18</sup> "Twenty-First Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team."

<sup>19</sup> "Twenty-Third Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team."

<sup>20</sup> Daniel Milton and Muhammad al-'Ubaydi, "The Fight Goes On: The Islamic State's Continuing Military Efforts in Liberated Cities" (West Point: Combating Terrorism Center, June 2017), <https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2017/07/The-Fight-Goes-On.pdf>; Brian Fishman, "Redefining the Islamic State" (*New America*, August 18, 2011), <https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/policy-papers/redefining-the-islamic-state/>.

<sup>21</sup> Douglas Ollivant and Bartle Bull, "Iraq After ISIS: What To Do Now" (*New America*, April 24, 2018), <https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/iraq-after-isis-what-do-now/introduction>; *After ISIS: What Is Next in the Middle East* (Future of War Conference: *New America*, 2018), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P2KitBX24Bc>.

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