



**One Hundred Nineteenth Congress
Committee on Homeland Security
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515**

June 1, 2026

The Honorable Markwayne Mullin
Secretary
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20598

Dear Secretary Mullin:

We write to request information on the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) plans for election security funding recently provided to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2026 Department of Homeland Security appropriations bill.

As the sector risk management agency (SRMA) for the election infrastructure subsector, CISA is responsible for coordinating with State and local election officials to secure our Nation's elections systems.¹ After being designated as the election infrastructure subsector's SRMA in 2017, CISA developed valuable partnerships with State and local election officials to support both the cybersecurity and physical security of elections facilities, technologies, and personnel. Key programs included funding the Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EI-ISAC); the provision of no-cost cybersecurity and physical security assessments, guidance, and training; and the deployment of election security advisors to each of CISA's 10 regions.² Between 2023 and 2024, CISA conducted "over 700 cyber assessments and nearly 1300 physical security assessments for election stakeholders across the country."³ This work, in coordination with Federal funding for election security improvements and the tireless work of election officials throughout the country, has significantly strengthened the security of our Nation's elections.

Unfortunately, under the Trump administration, CISA has halted its election security efforts and ceased fulfilling its SRMA obligations. In early 2025, then-Acting Director Bridget Bean ordered a pause of all of CISA election security activities while CISA conducted a review of its election

¹ Federal Executive Branch Agencies Roles and Responsibilities in United States Elections, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, et al., https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/Interagency_Election_Security_Fact_Sheet_022024.pdf.

² *Id.*

³ 2024 Year In Review, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, <https://www.cisa.gov/about/2024YIR> (last accessed May 18, 2026).

security efforts.⁴ CISA has never released the results of its review, but subsequent actions make clear that CISA's pause was not temporary but rather a full withdrawal of its election security support to State and local governments. Notably, CISA eliminated its election security advisor positions⁵ and ended its funding of the EI-ISAC.⁶ The President's Budget Requests for both FY 2026 and FY 2027 have proposed eliminating all of CISA's dedicated efforts for election security.⁷

Congress rejected the Trump Administration's attempt to abdicate the Federal government's election security obligations. Reflecting bipartisan concern about CISA's decision to abandon its election security responsibilities, the recently enacted FY 2026 DHS appropriations bill provided \$39.61 million to CISA to "continue Election Security Program activities funded in fiscal year 2024, including Election Security Advisors in each CISA Region and the continuation of the Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EI-ISAC)."⁸

Over the past 18 months, however, actions taken by the Department damaged many of the trusted relationships CISA spent nearly a decade building with State and local election officials.⁹ These trusted relationships served as the foundation of operational collaboration between CISA and election officials and helped better secure the entire election ecosystem, but they no longer exist. Considering the current lack of trust between CISA and State and local election officials,¹⁰ it is essential that election security funding be implemented in a way that supports State and local election officials' security needs and does not impose the President's political agenda on State and local election officials.

With the President threatening to "nationalize" elections and his continued efforts to pursue his conspiracy theories about the security of the 2020 election, many State and local election officials

⁴ Eric Geller, *Top US Election Security Watchdog Forced to Stop Election Security Work*, WIRED (Feb. 14, 2025), <https://www.wired.com/story/cisa-election-security-freeze-memo/>.

⁵ Christina A. Cassidy, *US cyber agency puts election security staffers who worked with the states on leave*, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 10, 2025), <https://apnews.com/article/election-security-cisa-kristi-noem-cybersecurity-5bac8ce416c46b4f4e44c94ae5874b39>.

⁶ Jule Pattison-Gordon, *The Feds Cut Funding for Election Cybersecurity. How Will Public Officials Adapt?*, GOVERNING (Dec. 2, 2025), <https://www.governing.com/management-and-administration/the-feds-cut-funding-for-election-cybersecurity-how-will-public-officials-adapt>.

⁷ Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Fiscal Year 2026 Congressional Justification, Dep't of Homeland Sec., https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2025-06/25_0613_cisa_fy26-congressional-budget-justificatin.pdf; Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Fiscal Year 2027 Congressional Justification, Dep't of Homeland Sec., https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2026-04/26_0403_ocfo-budget-cisa.pdf.

⁸ Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying Pub. Law No. 119-86 (2026), https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/fy26_homeland_jes.pdf.

⁹ See Kevin Collier, *Less staff, even less trust: Some states say they can't rely on Trump's DHS for election security*, NBC NEWS (Apr. 1, 2025), <https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/less-staff-even-less-trust-states-say-cant-rely-trumps-dhs-election-se-rcna220855> (quoting a secretary of state, "The political theater that we've seen out of the Department of Homeland Security, I don't want that anywhere near my security operations . . . I don't want that anywhere near my Threat Assessment operations. I don't want that anywhere near my technicians or the folks who are actually doing the hard work keeping us and our system safe.").

¹⁰ David DiMolfetta, *A House hearing highlighted warnings from state officials and other experts who say the Trump administration's dismantling of CISA's election work damages trust and coordination before the 2026 midterms*, NEXTGOV (Apr. 28, 2026), <https://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2026/04/federal-drawdown-election-support-destroyed-ongoing-relationships-experts-say/413181/>.

are reluctant to partner with the Federal government on election security matters.¹¹ Additionally, threats to deploy Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers to polling locations¹² have further undermined confidence in DHS's role in elections. With the new FY 2026 funding, CISA must ensure that trusted, nonpartisan, and voluntary election security assistance is provided to election officials, helping build confidence in the security of our election systems.

The midterm elections are rapidly approaching, and the primary elections are already underway. By all accounts, the Department is not well positioned to execute its election security obligations, and there is a concerning trust deficit between the Department and its State and local partners. The Department must act quickly and deliberately to provide security support to State and local election officials in a manner that prioritizes trust and transparency. It is critical for the Committee on Homeland Security to understand how CISA is fulfilling its election infrastructure security obligations and how it plans to spend its FY 2026 election security budget. Accordingly, please respond to the following questions by June 18, 2026:


1. Please provide a copy of the election security review conducted in early 2025.
2. As discussed, DHS's actions since January 20, 2025, have detrimentally eroded trusted relationships CISA has been building with State and local officials for nearly a decade. How will you ensure that DHS's actions do not further damage CISA's ability to provide election security support to State and local election officials? How will DHS and CISA restore trusted relationships with State and local election officials?
3. How many cybersecurity and physical security assessments has CISA conducted for election stakeholders since January 20, 2025? How many cybersecurity and physical security assessments did CISA conduct for election stakeholders between January 1, 2023, and November 4, 2024?
4. How many targeted election security threat briefings – classified and unclassified – has CISA provided to State and local election officials since January 20, 2025? How many targeted election security threat briefings – classified and unclassified – did CISA provide to State and local election officials between January 1, 2023, and November 4, 2024?
5. What are CISA's plans for providing cybersecurity and physical security assessments to election stakeholders utilizing CISA's FY 2026 election security funding?
6. How many staff will be dedicated to election security using CISA FY 2026 election security funding?

¹¹ Adam Sella, *Trump's Gutting of Election Security Fuels Worries for Midterms*, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2026), <https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/17/us/politics/trump-cisa-election-security.html>.

¹² Aaron Pellish, *Democratic district attorneys vow to prosecute federal agents who target voting sites*, POLITICO (May 18, 2026), <https://www.politico.com/news/2026/05/18/district-attorneys-voter-intimidation-00927460>.

7. By what date will CISA sign a cooperative agreement to provide funding to the EI-ISAC?
How much funding does CISA intend to provide to the EI-ISAC?
8. By what date does CISA intend to hire Election Security Advisors for each CISA region?
What qualifications will CISA require for Election Security Advisor positions to ensure they are nonpartisan experts who can build trusted relationships with State and local election officials?
9. Please provide a detailed description of how CISA plans to use the funding provided in the FY 2026 DHS spending bill to support State and local election security activities.
10. Please confirm that DHS will not deploy ICE officers or any other DHS law enforcement personnel to polling locations during the midterm elections.

Sincerely,



Bennie G. Thompson
Ranking Member



J. Luis Correa
Member of Congress



Shri Thanedar
Member of Congress




Seth Magaziner
Member of Congress




Dan Goldman
Member of Congress



Delia C. Ramirez
Member of Congress



Timothy M. Kennedy
Member of Congress



LaMonica McIver
Member of Congress




Julie Johnson
Member of Congress



Pablo José Hernández
Member of Congress




Nellie Pou
Member of Congress



James R. Walkinshaw
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Analilia Mejia
Member of Congress



Troy A. Carter, Sr.
Member of Congress



Al Green
Member of Congress

cc: The Honorable Andrew R. Garbarino, Chairman