

Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

October 20, 2026

The Hon. Markwayne Mullin
Secretary
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Washington, D.C. 20528

Dear Secretary Mullin:

This letter is to formalize previously made requests for the Department of Homeland Security to brief the House Committee on Homeland Security and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on how the Department is sharing election-related threat intelligence with state and local election officials. As election day draws closer, it is critical that our committees understand how DHS is supporting state and local election officials as they seek to administer secure elections.

Over the summer, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) participated in multi-agency classified briefings to staff from several committees. Setting aside the fact that similar briefings are traditionally provided to all Members of the House in advance of federal elections and were not this year, congressional attendees at the briefings were struck by the relative lack of coordination among interagency partners. The deficiency appeared particularly acute with respect to the roles, responsibilities, and processes for sharing election threat information with state and local partners.

Within DHS, CISA and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) are responsible for engaging with state and local governments to share information about election-related threats. CISA has additional responsibilities related to securing election infrastructure stemming from its broader critical infrastructure security mission. In the past, I&A accompanied CISA during briefings to Congress on DHS's election security activities. It is unclear why I&A has been absent this year.

Both CISA and I&A have experienced significant workforce losses over the past 21 months. CISA has lost nearly 1,000, or one-third, of its employees and eliminated its election security team. CISA also terminated funding for the Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EI-ISAC) and the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC), two entities that provided unique cybersecurity support of state and local entities and served as a force multiplier for information sharing. Despite a congressional mandate to restore funding to the EI-ISAC earlier this year, DHS has refused to comply. [See Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying Public Law 119-86 \(2026\)](#). CISA's [2026 Election Infrastructure Security Plan](#) arrived weeks behind schedule—too late to be of use to state and local election officials—and largely restated a generic menu of services it provides for all critical infrastructure.

For its part, I&A has lost approximately 35 percent of its workforce, and I&A leadership has formally de-prioritized intelligence collection and analysis on election interference and influence activities by foreign actors.

We are very concerned that these staffing and strategic changes have undermined DHS's ability to effectively partner with state and local election officials and to share information about threats to the upcoming election. State and local election officials are equally concerned. On one hand, they have so drastically lost trust in the Department that they are reluctant to share the threat information they observe. On the other, they have no confidence that DHS will share timely threat intelligence with them. This critical information sharing is not possible to replicate without the full, good-faith participation of federal and non-federal partners.

We understand that Heather Honey is serving as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Election Integrity at DHS. This appointment is deeply troubling given her documented history of denying the result of the 2020 election and supporting President Trump's efforts to overturn it. Although the scope of her authority is unclear, we understand that she was involved in previous DHS policies that withheld grant funding from states that did not radically change their election laws and policies during an election year. That grant funding could have been used by states to bolster election security efforts or information sharing infrastructure at a time when federal support has waned as a result of the staffing shortages created by the Trump administration.

State and local election officials are under tremendous pressure this election cycle. In addition to the administration's attempts to police voter rolls and impose new election rules, election officials are facing threats to their physical safety. Just this week, several election offices across the country were sent suspicious substances. We must ensure that DHS is providing state and local election officials the support necessary to carry out their critical mission. Accordingly, we request that you make available individuals from both CISA and I&A for a briefing this week or next week so that we can better understand how these components are supporting state and local election officials as they strive to administer secure elections.

Thank you for your urgent attention to this request.

Sincerely,



Bennie G. Thompson
Ranking Member
House Committee on Homeland Security



James A. Himes
Ranking Member
House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence

cc: The Honorable Nick Andersen, Acting Director, CISA
The Honorable Matthew A. Kozma, Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis
The Honorable Andrew R. Garbarino, Chairman, House Committee on Homeland Security
The Honorable Eric "Rick" Crawford, Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence